Introduction
I propose a ‡exible framework for the quantitative analysis of unilateral and multilateral trade policy. It is based on a multi-country multi-industry general equilibrium model of international trade featuring inter-industry trade as in Ricardo (1817) , intra-industry trade as in Krugman (1980) , and special interest politics as in Grossman and Helpman (1994) . By combining these elements, it takes a uni…ed view of trade policy which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection. Speci…cally, it features import tari¤s which serve to manipulate the terms-of-trade, shift pro…ts away from other countries, and channel pro…ts towards politically in ‡uential industries. With respect to unilateral trade policy, I …nd that US optimal tari¤s vary widely across industries and trading partners and average 66 percent. They would increase real income in the US by 2.6 percent and decrease real income in the other countries by 1.6 percent on average. In the US, imports would fall by 27 percent on average and a reallocation of resources to more pro…table industries would increase pro…ts by 4.2 percent on average. In the other countries, imports would fall by 12 percent on average and a reallocation of resources to less pro…table industries would decrease pro…ts by 1.8 percent on average. Traditional termsof-trade e¤ects and new trade pro…t-shifting e¤ects are the key driving forces behind these results. Political economy e¤ects are only of limited quantitative importance.
With regard to multilateral trade policy, I …nd that the world trade war tari¤s vary widely across industries, countries, and trading partners and average 63 percent. This is roughly in line with the noncooperative tari¤s observed following the Smoot-Hawley Tari¤ Act of 1930.
They would substantially decrease real income in all countries with the average loss amounting to 4.1 percent. I also …nd that tari¤ changes which correspond to the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity can be characterized by a simple formula which is easy to implement in practice.
While this formula identi…es a number of industries in which there is still scope for future reciprocal trade negotiations, it also suggests that the overall gains from such negotiations would be quite small. I am unaware of any quantitative analysis of unilateral and multilateral trade policy which is of similar scope as the one provided here. I believe that this is the …rst quantitative framework which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection. I also believe that this is the …rst study which provides estimates of optimal and noncooperative tari¤s at the industry level for the major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations. The surprising lack of comparable work is most likely rooted in long-binding methodological and computational constraints. In particular, widely accepted calibration techniques of general equilibrium trade models have only become available quite recently following the seminal work of Eaton and Kortum (2002) . Also, the calculation of disaggregated optimal and noncooperative tari¤s is very demanding computationally and was simply not feasible without present-day computers.
The most immediate predecessors are Perroni and Whalley (2000) , Broda et al (2008) , and Ossa (2011). Perroni and Whalley (2000) provide quantitative estimates of optimal and noncooperative tari¤s in a simple Armington model which features only traditional terms-oftrade e¤ects. Ossa (2011) provides such estimates in a simple Krugman (1980) model which features only new trade production relocation e¤ects. Both contributions allow trade policy to operate only at the most aggregate level so that a single tari¤ is assumed to apply against all imports from any given country. 2 Broda et al (2008) provide detailed statistical estimates of the inverse export supply elasticities faced by a number of non-WTO member countries.
The idea is to test the traditional optimal tari¤ formula which states that a country's optimal tari¤ is equal to the inverse export supply elasticity it faces in equilibrium. 3 The paper further relates to an extensive body of theoretical and quantitative work. The traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection are borrowed from the theoretical trade policy literature including Johnson (1953-54) , Venables (1987) , and Grossman and Helpman (1994) . 4 The analysis of the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity builds on the pioneering work of Bagwell and Staiger (1999) The regions are Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, the US, and a residual Rest of the World and are chosen to comprise the main players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations. I need data 2 The work of Perroni and Whalley (2000) is in the computable general equilibrium tradition and extends an earlier contribution by Hamilton and Whalley (1983) . It predicts implausibly high noncooperative tari¤s of up to 1000 percent. 3 This approach is not suitable for estimating the optimal tari¤s of WTO member countries. This is because such countries impose cooperative tari¤s so that the factual inverse export supply elasticities they face are not informative of the counterfactual inverse export supply elasticities they would face if they imposed optimal tari¤s under all but the most restrictive assumptions. 4 The analyzed pro…t shifting e¤ect is more closely related to the production relocation e¤ect in Venables (1987) than the classic pro…t shifting e¤ect in Brander and Spencer (1981) . This is explained in more detail in footnote 12. See Mrazova (2010) for a recent treatment of classic pro…t shifting e¤ects in the context of GATT/WTO negotiations. 5 Existing work typically focuses on quantifying the e¤ects of exogenous tari¤ changes. Caliendo and Parro (2011) , for example, analyze the e¤ects of the North American Free Trade Agreement. One exception can be found in the work of Alvarez and Lucas (2007) which includes a short discussion of optimal tari¤s in small open economies.
on trade ‡ows and tari¤s as well as estimates of two sets of structural parameters. I construct the matrix of international and domestic trade ‡ows from United Nations trade data, NBER production data, and World Bank production data. I take the matrix of tari¤s from an extension of United Nations tari¤ data. I use estimates of the elasticities of substitution by Broda and Weinstein (2006) and estimates of the in ‡uence of lobbies as well as the lobbying status of industries from Goldberg and Maggi (1999) . A detailed discussion of the data including the applied aggregation, extrapolation, and matching procedures can be found in the appendix.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I lay out the basic setup, characterize the equilibrium for given tari¤ changes, demonstrate how to compute the general equilibrium e¤ects of tari¤ changes, and discuss the welfare e¤ects of tari¤ changes.
I then turn to US optimal tari¤s, world Nash tari¤s, and GATT/WTO negotiations.
Analysis

Basic setup
There are N countries indexed by i or j and S industries indexed by s. Consumers have access to a continuum of di¤erentiated varieties. Preferences over these varieties are given by the following utility functions:
where x ijs is the quantity of an industry s variety from country i consumed in country j, M is is the mass of industry s varieties produced in country i, s > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between industry s varieties, and js is the fraction of country j income spent on industry s varieties.
Each variety is uniquely associated with an individual …rm. Firms are homogeneous within industries and their technologies are summarized by the following inverse production functions:
where l is is the labor requirement of an industry s …rm in country i featuring iceberg trade barriers ijs and a productivity parameter ' is . Each …rm has monopoly power with respect to its own variety and the number of …rms is given exogenously. 6 Governments can impose import tari¤s but do not have access to other policy instruments. 7 I denote the ad valorem tari¤ imposed by country j against imports from country i in industry s by t ijs and make frequent use of the shorthand ijs t ijs + 1 throughout. Government preferences are given by the following objective functions:
where
is the welfare of country j, X j is total expenditure or income in country j, P j is the ideal price index in country j, js 0 is the political economy weight of industry s in country j, and js are the pro…ts of industry s in country j. 8 Notice that governments simply maximize welfare if the political economy weights are zero.
The interpretation of the political economy weights is that one dollar of pro…ts in industry s of country j counts 1 + js as much as one dollar of wage income or tari¤ revenue in the government's objective function. This formulation of government preferences can be viewed as a reduced form representation of the "protection for sale" theory of Grossman and Helpman 6 The model can also be solved and calibrated with free entry and …xed costs of production. I focus on a version without free entry for two main reasons. First, because it features positive pro…ts and therefore lends itself more naturally to an analysis of political economy considerations. Second, because it rules out corner solutions with zero production in some sectors so that it can be implemented using a much simpler algorithm. See footnote 12 for a further discussion of the model with free entry. 7 This restriction is motivated by the fact that import tari¤s have always been by far the most important trade policy instrument in practice. However, it would be easy to extend the framework to also include export subsidies, import quotas, or voluntary export restraints. See Bagwell and Staiger (2009a, 2009b ) for a discussion of the importance of this restriction for the theory of trade agreements in a range of simple new trade models. 8 As in most trade models, welfare is the same as real income if nominal income is de ‡ated by the ideal price index. This is because the ideal price index is a unit expenditure function and utility only depends on consumption. Nominal income consists of labor income, pro…ts, and tari¤ revenue. (1994) . I compute the political economy weights based on the estimates of Goldberg and Maggi (1999) using a procedure which I explain in detail in the appendix. 9 
Equilibrium for given tari¤s
Utility maximization implies that …rms in industry s of country i face demands
where p is is the ex-factory price of an industry s variety from country i and P js is the ideal price index of industry s varieties in country j. Also, pro…t maximization requires that …rms in industry s of country i charge a constant mark-up over marginal costs
where w i is the wage rate in country i.
It is useful to characterize the equilibrium for given tari¤s with four condensed equilibrium conditions. The …rst condition follows from substituting equations (2), (4), and (5) into the relationship de…ning industry pro…ts is = M is P j p is ijs x ijs w i l is :
The second condition combines equations (2), (4), and (5) with the requirement for labor
9 In order to clearly expose the novel features of my framework, I deliberately abstract from many bells and whistles which can be found in other quantitative work. For example, I do not allow for intermediate goods or nontraded goods which is in line with much of the theoretical trade policy literature. The idea is that intermediate goods tend to magnify the e¤ects of trade policy while nontraded goods tend to dampen the e¤ects of trade policy so that omitting both seems like a reasonable …rst pass.
The third condition results from substituting equation (5) into the formula for the ideal price
And the …nal condition combines equations (4) and (5) with the budget constraint equating total expenditure to labor income, plus tari¤ revenue, plus aggregate pro…ts, minus aggregate net exports which are treated as a parameter in this static environment: 10
Conditions (6) - (9) represent a system of 2N (S + 1) equations in the 2N (S + 1) unknowns w i , X i , P is , and is . It can be solved given a numeraire and I normalize P j w j L j = 1 throughout.
General equilibrium e¤ects of tari¤ changes
An advantage of this characterization is that the general equilibrium e¤ects of counterfactual tari¤ changes can now be computed using a method inspired by Dekle at al (2007) . In particular, conditions (6) -(9) can be rewritten in changes as
1 0 Treating the aggregate trade balance as a parameter is standard in the quantitative trade literature. The idea is that it is determined by intertemporal saving and investment decisions which do not respond to trade policy. One problem is that this dichotomy cannot hold in the limit as tari¤s approach prohibitive levels because the aggregate trade balance then also has to go to zero. As a result, a more realistic speci…cation may involve a negative relationship between the absolute value of the aggregate trade balance and tari¤s. Since the details of this relationship are far from clear, it would be ideal to explore a number of alternative speci…cations. Unfortunately, this is very di¢ cult in practice since it takes about two months until all algorithms converge. I therefore stick to the standard assumption and point out where and how it a¤ects my results.
where a "hat" denotes the ratio between the counterfactual and the factual value, ijs
js X j is the value of industry s trade ‡owing from country i to country j evaluated at world prices.
Equations (10) - (13) represent a system of 2N (S + 1) equations in the 2N (S + 1) un-
Crucially, their coe¢ cients depend on s and observables only so that the full general equilibrium response to counterfactual tari¤ changes can be computed without further information on any of the remaining model parameters. Moreover, all required observables can be inferred directly from widely available trade and tari¤ data since the model requires
and
Notice that this procedure ensures that the model perfectly matches all observed trade ‡ows and tari¤s by default. 11 As an illustration, the upper panel of Table 1a 
Welfare e¤ects of tari¤ changes
Given the general equilibrium e¤ects of counterfactual tari¤ changes, the implied welfare e¤ects can be computed from b
js is the change in the aggregate price index. This framework features both traditional as well as new trade welfare e¤ects of trade policy. This can be seen most clearly from a log-linear approximation around factuals with aggregate net exports set to zero. As I explain in detail in the appendix, it yields the following relationship for the welfare change induced by tari¤ changes where
is the percentage change in country j's welfare and so on:
The …rst term is a traditional terms-of-trade e¤ect which captures changes in country j's real income due to di¤erential changes in the world prices of country j's production and consumption bundles. Country j bene…ts from an increase in the world prices of its consumption bundle relative to the world prices of its production bundle because its exports then command more imports in world markets. The terms-of-trade e¤ect can also be viewed as a relative wage e¤ect since world prices are proportional to wages given the pricing formula (5).
The second term is a new trade pro…t shifting e¤ect which captures changes in country j's real income due to changes in country j's aggregate pro…ts originating from changes in industry output. It takes changes in industry pro…ts, nets out changes in industry prices, and then aggregates the remaining changes over all industries using pro…t shares as weights.
These remaining changes are changes in industry pro…ts originating from changes in industry output since industry pro…ts are proportional to industry sales in this constant markup environment. 12 The last term is a combined tari¤ revenue e¤ect which captures changes in country j's real income due to changes in country j's tari¤ revenue originating from changes in import volumes. It takes changes in import values, nets out changes in import prices, and then aggregates the remaining changes over all countries and industries using tari¤ revenue shares as weights. These remaining changes are changes in import volumes since changes in import values can be decomposed into changes in import prices and import volumes.
As an illustration, the lower panel of Table 1a reports the welfare e¤ects of the counterfactual 25 percentage point increase in the US tari¤ on pharmaceuticals or cosmetics discussed above and decomposes them into terms-of-trade and pro…t shifting components along the lines of equation (14) . As can be seen, US welfare increases by 0.07 percent if the tari¤ increase occurs in pharmaceuticals but decreases by 0.03 percent if the tari¤ increase occurs in cosmetics. The di¤erential welfare e¤ects are due to di¤erential pro…t shifting e¤ects. While the terms-of-trade e¤ect is positive in both cases, the pro…t shifting e¤ect is positive if the tari¤ increase occurs in pharmaceuticals and negative if the pro…t increase occurs in cosmetics.
The positive terms-of-trade e¤ects are a direct consequence of the increase in the US 1 2 This pro…t shifting e¤ect is more closely related to the production relocation e¤ect from Venables (1987) than the classic pro…t shifting e¤ect from Brander and Spencer (1981) . It can be shown that in a version of the model with free entry and …xed costs of production, the equivalent of equation (14) would be
, where the second term can now be interpreted as a production relocation e¤ect. Essentially, tari¤s lead to changes in industry output at the intensive margin without free entry and at the extensive margin with free entry. relative wage identi…ed above. The di¤erential pro…t shifting e¤ects are the result of crossindustry di¤erences in markups which are brought about by cross-industry di¤erences in the elasticity of substitution. Since the quantity of US output always increases in the protected industry but decreases in other industries, the change in pro…ts which is due to changes in industry output is always positive in the protected industry but negative in other industries.
The overall pro…t shifting e¤ect depends on the net e¤ect which is positive if the tari¤ increase occurs in a high pro…tability industry such as pharmaceuticals and negative if it occurs in a low pro…tability industry such as cosmetics. 13 Notice that the overall welfare e¤ects are smaller than the sum of the terms-of-trade and pro…t shifting e¤ects in both examples. One missing factor is, of course, the tari¤ revenue e¤ect from equation (14) . However, this e¤ect is approximately zero in both examples since the loss in tari¤ revenue due to a decrease in import volumes in the protected industry is approximately o¤set by the gain in tari¤ revenue due to an increase in import volumes in other industries. 14 The discrepancy therefore largely re ‡ects the fact that equation (14) only provides a rough approximation if tari¤ changes are as large as 25 percentage points since it is obtained from a linearization around factuals. 15 
US optimal tari¤s
The above discussion suggests that governments have incentives to use import tari¤s to increase relative wages generating a positive terms-of-trade e¤ect and induce entry into highpro…tability industries generating a positive pro…t shifting e¤ect. However, these incentives combine with political economy considerations as governments also seek to protect high is 1 3 As is easy to verify, equations (5) and (11) = 0 if s = for all s so that there is then no pro…t shifting e¤ect. 1 4 The volume of overall US imports falls as a consequence of the higher tari¤s in pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. The reason that tari¤ revenue still remains largely unchanged is that US tari¤s on pharmaceuticals and cosmetics are relatively small compared to US tari¤s in other industries. 1 5 In particular, the overall reduction in imports associated with the increase in tari¤s also reduces the import shares which leverage the improvement in relative world prices. This e¤ect does not appear in equation (14) since changes in import shares are second order e¤ects.
industries to channel pro…ts to politically in ‡uential lobbies. The optimal tari¤s of a government maximize that government's objective function (3) subject to conditions (10) -(13).
They can be computed using a simple iterative algorithm which I discuss in detail in the appendix. Figure 1a summarizes the optimal tari¤s of the US taking as given all other countries' factual tari¤s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the optimal tari¤ of the US with respect to all trading partners against the industry rank. As can be seen, optimal tari¤s vary widely across industries and are strongly decreasing in the elasticity of substitution as one would expect given the pro…t shifting motive for protection. There is also some variation across trading partners although it is much less pronounced. At 62 percent, the average US optimal tari¤ imposed against Brazil is the lowest. At 69 percent, the average US optimal tari¤ imposed against Japan is the highest. The average US optimal tari¤ imposed against all trading partners combined is 66 percent.
The quantitative e¤ect of political economy forces is very limited. In particular, the simple average of the di¤erence between the optimal tari¤s summarized in Figure 1a and the optimal tari¤s obtained by setting all political economy weights equal to zero is only 0.35 percentage points with the maximum di¤erence being only 1.15 percentage points. This is mainly due to the small political economy weights which are constructed based on estimates by Maggi and Goldberg (1999) using a procedure which I discuss in detail in the appendix. An apparent alternative would have been to recalibrate the political economy weights given the trade and tari¤ data at hand. However, the di¢ culty is that most countries set tari¤s cooperatively in GATT/WTO negotiations so that factual tari¤s are not informative of optimal tari¤s without strong assumptions on the nature of the negotiation process. 16 Figure 2a illustrates the changes in the value of US imports corresponding to US optimal tari¤s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the predicted change in US imports with respect to all trading partners against the industry rank. As a consequence of the tilted tari¤ schedule, US imports fall in most industries but increase sharply in the highest elasticity industries. US relative wages rise faster than US tari¤s in the highest elasticity industries so that importing e¤ectively becomes more attractive in these industries. There is again relatively little variation across trading partners. At -33 percent, US imports from the Rest of the World fall the most. At -14 percent, US imports from Brazil fall the least.
Overall, US imports fall by 27 percent. 17 Figure 3a highlights the changes in the quantity of US production corresponding to US optimal tari¤s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the predicted change in US shipments with respect to all trading partners against the industry rank. It also includes changes in US domestic shipments as well as changes in US total shipments by industry. US shipments to trading partners fall across the board mirroring the decline in US imports. This decline is particularly pronounced in high elasticity industries. US total shipments increase in low elasticity industries but decrease in high elasticity industries as one would expect given the pro…t shifting motive for protection. Overall, the reallocation of resources towards high pro…tability industries increases total US pro…ts by 4.2 percent. 18 The …rst column of Table 2a lists the welfare e¤ects corresponding to US optimal tari¤s. As can be seen, US real income is predicted to increase by 2.6 percent at the expense of all other countries. The US can gain at the expense of other countries because the terms-of-trade and pro…t shifting e¤ects have a beggar-thy-neighbor character. This can be seen from the second and third columns of Table 2a . While US wages are predicted to rise by 21.9 percent relative to the numeraire, the wages of the other countries are predicted to fall by an average 5.6 percent relative to the numeraire. And while total US pro…ts are predicted to increase by 4.2 percent due to the reallocation of resources towards high pro…tability industries, total pro…ts 1 7 Changes in the value of imports can be computed at various levels of aggregation from b Tijs = (b !i)
Tijs, and so on. . Changes in total pro…ts induced by the reallocation of resources across sectors can be computed from
in the other countries are predicted to fall by an average 1.8 percent due to the reallocation of resources towards low pro…tability industries.
China and Japan are predicted to su¤er most severely from US optimal tari¤s. Chinese exports account for 36 percent of Chinese sales which makes China by far the most open economy in the sample. This implies that US optimal tari¤s hit China particularly hard which explains the large adverse relative wage and pro…t shifting e¤ects. The Japanese aggregate trade surplus accounts for 14 percent of Japanese sales which makes Japan by far the largest net exporter in the sample. The percentage drop in Japanese imports must therefore far exceed the percentage drop in Japanese exports in order to keep Japanese net exports unchanged.
As a consequence, Japanese imports must become much more expensive relative to Japanese exports which explains the large drop in Japanese relative wages. 19;20
World Nash tari¤s
The above discussion of US optimal tari¤s assumes that other countries do not retaliate which allows the US to bene…t considerably at their expense. I now turn to an analysis of the Nash equilibrium in which all countries retaliate optimally. The Nash tari¤s are such that each government chooses its tari¤s to maximize its objective function (3) given the tari¤s of all other governments as well as conditions (10) - (13) . They can be computed using a simple iterative algorithm which I discuss in detail in the appendix. I refer to optimal tari¤s without retaliation as optimal tari¤s and optimal tari¤s with retaliation as Nash tari¤s throughout.
Figures 4a and 4b provide a summary of the world Nash tari¤s. Figure 4a ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the average Nash tari¤ imposed by each country against the industry rank. Figure 4b ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the average Nash tari¤ faced by each country against the industry rank. As can 1 9 Of course, this depends crucially on the assumption that aggregate trade balances are exogenous. If they were allowed to be decreasing in the tari¤s, the Japanese wage adjustments would be less pronounced. See footnote 10 for a detailed discussion of the assumption of constant aggregate trade balances.
2 0 The percentage changes in the value of imports and exports are reported in the last two columns of Table  2a . The percentage drop in imports exceeds the percentage drop in exports whenever a country runs an aggregate trade surplus and vice versa. Overall, world trade is predicted to fall by 17 percent. be seen, the average Nash tari¤s are quite similar across countries. 21 The average across all Nash tari¤s is 63 percent which is remarkably close to the average tari¤ of 50 percent typically reported for the trade war following the Smoot-Hawley tari¤ Act of 1930. 22 This trade war is the only full- ‡edged trade war in economic history and therefore the only benchmark available to me. Of course, it can only serve as a rough reference point given the di¤erences in the set of players and the timing of the experiment.
In order to compare these world Nash tari¤s to the US optimal tari¤s discussed above, I now again focus on the US and present the Nash equilibrium analogs to Figures 1a -3a. Figure 1b is the Nash equilibrium analog to Figure 1a . It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the US Nash tari¤ with respect to all trading partners against the industry rank. As can be seen, the pattern of US Nash tari¤s is very similar to the pattern of US optimal tari¤s. However, each US Nash tari¤ exceeds the corresponding US optimal tari¤ as one might intuitively expect. At 75 percent, the average US Nash tari¤ imposed against Brazil is the lowest. At 92 percent, the average US Nash tari¤ imposed against Japan is the highest. The average across all US Nash tari¤s is 82 percent and therefore exceeds the average across all US optimal tari¤s by 16 percentage points. Figure 2b is the Nash equilibrium analog to Figure 2a . It illustrates the changes in the value of US imports corresponding to world Nash tari¤s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the predicted change in US imports with respect to all trading partners against the industry rank. As can be seen, the US import responses to world Nash tari¤s summarized in Figure 2b are largely a magni…ed version of the US import responses to US optimal tari¤s summarized in Figure 2a . At -64 percent, US imports from the Rest of the World fall the most. At -19 percent, US imports from Japan fall the least. Overall, US imports fall by 48 percent as a consequence of world Nash tari¤s which is almost twice the 2 1 The EU imposes the lowest average Nash tari¤s (56 percent) and the US imposes the highest average Nash tari¤s (82 percent). At the same time, the US faces the lowest average Nash tari¤s (58 percent) and Japan faces the highest average Nash tari¤s (70 percent). 2 2 See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (2002: 43) . There is a small number of zeros in the matrix of trade ‡ows. Since the corresponding Nash tari¤s can be set to arbitrary values, I do not include them in the calculation of any averages. response predicted as a consequence of US optimal tari¤s. Figure 3b is the Nash equilibrium analog to Figure 3a . It highlights the changes in the quantity of US production corresponding to world Nash tari¤s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots the predicted change in US shipments with respect to all trading partners against the industry rank. It also includes the changes in US domestic shipments as well as changes in US total shipments by industry. As can be seen, the response of US shipments exhibits less cross-industry dispersion under world Nash tari¤s than under US optimal tari¤s. Since this is particularly true with regards to US total shipments, the US is less successful at reallocating resources towards high pro…tability industries in the Nash equilibrium. This re ‡ects the fact that all countries attempt to promote their high pro…tability industries at the same time. Overall, the reallocation of resources towards high pro…tability industries increases total US pro…ts by 1.2 percent under world Nash tari¤s which is less than one third of the e¤ect under US optimal tari¤s.
The …rst column of Table 2b lists the welfare e¤ects of world Nash tari¤s. As can be seen, the US is no longer able to gain at the expense of other countries and welfare falls across the board. Intuitively, each country now increases its import tari¤s in an attempt to induce favorable terms-of-trade, pro…t shifting, and political economy e¤ects. The end result is a large drop in trade volumes which leaves all countries worse o¤. However, there are still substantial adjustments in wages and pro…ts as can be seen from columns 2 and 3 of Table 2b .
As a consequence, there are sizeable di¤erences in the overall welfare e¤ects across countries.
At -0.5 percent, the US loses the least. At -8.6 percent and -9.1 percent, China and Japan lose the most. On average, welfare falls by 4.1 percent.
The reasons why China and Japan are predicted to su¤er so severely from protectionism are the same as before. China is by far the most open economy in the sample so that world Nash tari¤s induce large adverse relative wage and pro…t shifting e¤ects. Japan is by far the largest net exporter in the sample so that the large contraction in trade volumes requires a large reduction in Japanese relative wages to keep Japanese net exports unchanged. The story for the US is the mirror image of the story for Japan. The US aggregate trade de…cit accounts for 33 percent of US imports making the US by far the largest net importer in the sample. The percentage drop in US exports must therefore far exceed the percentage drop in US imports to keep US net imports unchanged. As a consequence, US exports must become much more expensive relative to US imports which explains the large increase in US relative wages. 23;24
GATT/WTO negotiations
The welfare losses from world Nash tari¤s can be viewed as the welfare gains from international trade policy cooperation. 25 The primary forum for international trade policy cooperation is the GATT/WTO. In a nutshell, GATT/WTO regulations require countries to impose tari¤s according to the principle of nondiscrimination and change tari¤s according to the principle of reciprocity. While the principle of nondiscrimination simply prohibits imposing di¤erent tari¤s against di¤erent trading partners, the principle of reciprocity is much more loosely de…ned. In particular, countries are encouraged to liberalize reciprocally in trade negotiations in the sense that they make tari¤ concessions of equal value. Similarly, countries are entitled to retaliate reciprocally in trade disputes in the sense that they remove tari¤ concessions of equal value. 26 I interpret this de…nition of the principle of reciprocity as referring to an ideal of mutual tari¤ changes which have no terms-of-trade and pro…t shifting e¤ects. Formally, such tari¤ changes can be found by imposing the restrictions
p is p is = 0 and 2 3 Again, this depends crucially on the assumption that aggregate trade balances are exogenous. If they were allowed to be decreasing in the tari¤s, the Japanese and US wage adjustments would be less pronounced. See footnote 10 for a detailed discussion of the assumption of constant aggregate trade balances. 2 4 The percentage changes in the value of imports and exports are reported in the last two columns of Table  2b . The percentage drop in imports exceeds the percentage drop in exports whenever a country runs an aggregate trade surplus and vice versa. Overall, world trade is predicted to fall by 57 percent. 2 5 Of course, the welfare gains are the inverse of the welfare losses strictly speaking. They amount to 3.4% for Brazil, 9.4% for China, 2.4% for the European Union, 2.8% for India, 10.1% for Japan, 2.3% for the Rest of the World, 0.5% for the US, and 4.4% on average. 2 6 These principles as well as their numerous exceptions are discussed in detail in Bagwell and Staiger (2002) . One particularly important exception is that GATT/WTO members are allowed to sign free trade agreements in spite of the principle of nondiscrimination. 
where js denotes the nondiscriminatory tari¤ imposed by country j in industry s. This is a system of N equations in N tari¤ changes whose coe¢ cients are in terms of observable trade ‡ows only. Given one country's tari¤ change in a particular industry, it uniquely pins down the necessary responses of all other countries in the same industry since one of the equations is always linearly dependent.
The …rst term captures that country v needs to respond more to a tari¤ change by country j the larger is the share of country v's exports going to country j. The second term captures that country v needs to respond more to a tari¤ change by any country the larger are country 2 7 Bagwell and Staiger (1999) interpret the principle of reciprocity as referring to an ideal of mutual tari¤ changes which bring about changes in the volume of each country's imports that are of equal value to changes in the volume of its exports. They demonstrate that this ideal can eliminate all terms-of-trade e¤ects which is also true in the environment discussed here. In particular, their interpretation implies P j6 =i P s pjsdQjis = P j6 =i P s pisdQijs. Also, di¤erentiating the trade balance condition yields
s (pisdQijs + Qijsdpis). If aggregate trade imbalances are set equal to zero, these relationships combine to P i P s T ijs X j dp js p js dp is p is = 0. This is illustrated in Table 1b which revisits the e¤ects of a counterfactual 25 percentage point increase in the US tari¤ on pharmaceuticals or cosmetics discussed above. The key di¤erence is that the US trading partners are now assumed to respond reciprocally to the US tari¤ increase according to formula (15) . 28 As can be seen, the US is now predicted to lose from the tari¤ increase in both industries since the terms-of-trade and pro…t shifting e¤ects are all but eliminated. This is because US wages and US production respond much less to the US tari¤ increase given the retaliatory responses of the US trading partners. Table 3a reports the combined e¤ects of the largest possible tari¤ cuts in all industries which are consistent with formula (15) . It is based on the assumption that countries do not impose import subsidies so that the largest possible tari¤ cuts in a given industry are always such that one country completely eliminates its tari¤s in that industry. As can be seen, the predicted welfare gains and trade responses are small suggesting that there is little scope for future reciprocal trade liberalization. The reason is that the EU, Japan, and the US already impose low tari¤s in most industries so that there is little room for further reciprocal tari¤ cuts. The largest reciprocal tari¤ cuts are possible in textiles but also only average to 3.29 percent. No tari¤ cuts at all are possible, for example, in road vehicles since Japan's tari¤ is already at 0.00 percent in that industry. 29 2 8 The speci…c tari¤ increases in pharmaceuticals and cosmetics required by formula (15) are 4% and 23% for Brazil, 11% and 24% for China, 31% and 59% for the EU, 71% and 51% for India, 13% and 12% for Japan, and 7% and 10% for the Rest of the World. 2 9 Complete trade liberalization in all countries and industries is not a likely outcome of multilateral trade negotiations because it does not lead to Pareto gains. At -1.3%, India is predicted to lose the most because its average factual tari¤ is the highest in the sample (27.0%). At 0.6%, Japan is predicted to gain the most A direct test of the framework's quantitative predictions is challenging given that most countries now impose cooperative tari¤s as a result of GATT/WTO negotiations. One approach would be to collect detailed historic trade and tari¤ data and see if the framework can not only match the average but also the distribution of tari¤s observed during the trade because its average factual tari¤ is the lowest in the sample (1.5%). The interested reader can …nd a summary of all associated e¤ects in Table 3b . Table B1 provides a list of unorganized industries at the SIC 3-digit level which I aggregate to the SITC-Rev2 2-digit level using the same concordance I used for the US shipment data. I then rank the SITC-Rev2 2-digit level industries by how many unorganized SIC 3-digit level industries they contain and impose the share of unorganized industries from Table B1 . I …nally set is = 1 = in all organized industries and is = 0 in all unorganized industries, where = 0:9837 is the average "implied " from their Table   1 . I apply the same political economy weights in all countries. 
Algorithm
The algorithm I use to compute US optimal tari¤s and world Nash tari¤s is a straightforward (14) If N X j = 0, equilibrium conditions (8) and (9) can be approximated as
which immediately combines to equation (14) since
. Notice that changes in pro…ts which are due to changes in prices are attributed to the terms-of-trade e¤ect. Notice also that changes in the price index which directly result from changes in tari¤s cancel with changes in tari¤ revenue which directly result from changes in tari¤s.
Derivation of equation (15)
Treating ijs as a component of iceberg trade barriers yields the following versions of equilibrium conditions (10) - (13):
where ijs and is are de…ned as before and e ijs T ijs / P m T mjs . The only di¤erences are that price changes are now weighted by import shares net of tari¤s in condition (22) and that expenditure changes no longer include changes in tari¤ revenue in equation (23) . Imposing 
Combining these approximations and imposing nondiscrimination then yields equation (15) . to the value in column 1 because they are computed using equation (14) which is a linear approximation. All entries are rounded to the number of digits shown. Notes: The entries are the percentage change in real income (column 1), the percentage change in the nominal wage relative to the numeraire (column 2), the percentage change total pro…ts due to changes in industry output (column 3), the percentage change in the value of imports (column 4), and the percentage change in the value of exports (column 5). All entries are rounded to the number of digits shown. Notes: The entries are the percentage change in real income (column 1), the percentage change in the nominal wage relative to the numeraire (column 2), the percentage change total pro…ts due to changes in industry output (column 3), the percentage change in the value of imports (column 4), and the percentage change in the value of exports (column 5). All entries are rounded to the number of digits shown. 
